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The meaning of the word istoriia1 in modern 
Russian language is transforming in the conceptual 
sense. Throughout the past several years, mass 
media has been using the word in the meaning 
of a thing/object. For example, on the radio we 
can frequently hear expressions like: eto moia 
istoriia (this is my story/history), eto ego istoriia 
(that is his story/history), eto drugaia istoriia (it 
is a different story), eto chuzhaia istoriia (it is a 
story of someone else), eto sherstianaia istoriia, 
kozhanaia, vegetarianskaia, iuzhnaia etc. (it is 
the history/story of wool, leather, vegetarianism, 
South etc.) Let us emphasize that istoriia does 
not stand for “a story about something” with 
a plot, resolution and conclusion. Saying eto 
vegetarianskaia istoriia (this is a vegetarian story) 
the speaker indicates that he changes the topic of 
the conversation. He spoke about meat, and the 
words “vegetarian story” mark the beginning of 
a narration about vegetarians, vegetarianism in 
general, special recipes etc. Two hours of attentive 
listening to morning radio programs and making 
notes is enough to see that istoriia is, first, 
something really simple; secondly, something 
indefinite; thirdly, something strictly personal 
and subjective. In point of fact, istoriia turns into 
an opinion, the proverbial “world outlook”, which 
is, naturally, different for everyone and therefore 
is not subject to any evaluation; it makes no sense 
to analyse it; it is not exposed to any positive 
criticism.
Such effect in respect with istoriia as 
“history” is natural though sad. Historical events 
are losing their scale; a sports event, an opening 
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of a shop, political elections, an expensive 
purchase are taken as historical events now. 
What used to be a private example out of many 
within the framework of big old classic history, is 
now an event of the history, the world’s evening 
sensation.
The hypothesis of this research is the thesis 
on the dependence of history on the personal 
memory of a person. One cannot have history 
without having memory. If we have a history right 
away, we become vulnerable in a way that we can 
be imposed this or that history on ourselves. But 
still, the term history maintains one of its old 
meanings used by Hegel or by modern school 
textbooks. The subjects of history are nations, 
countries, geniuses, world ideas, providence, not 
vegetarians, athletes or consumers. Equalling 
these subjects to each other, let us repeat, would 
mean that history is open for everyone to do 
anything in it. That is why we suggest that we 
consider history from the point of view of 
personal memory.
There is an interesting episode in “The 
Idiot” by F.M. Dostoyevsky concerning a money 
issue. Out of pity, Prince Myshkin gives two 
hundred fifty roubles to a poor student; the plot 
of the novel turns in such a way that the student 
takes this money as an offence from the Prince 
and returns it in public. The meaning of the 
gesture is to demonstrate that the student is not 
a beggar and needs no charity. One of the guests 
opens the envelope and finds only one hundred 
roubles inside, not two hundred fifty. Burdovsky 
(the student) and all his company who come 
to demand a part of the Prince’s inheritance 
begin to argue that the amount of the returned 
money does not matter. The gesture of return is 
performed in order to insult the Prince as much as 
possible, showing Burdovsky off as a noble man. 
The company of student Burdovsky is depicted 
by Dostoyevsky as a new generation of young 
people, half-socialistic, undereducated, but 
terribly ambitious. The main thing these young 
people thrust is the idea of right. They keep 
repeating that they have a legal right to demand 
a part of the Prince’s inheritance, that they have 
a right to come into his house, to raise voice at 
the aristocrats being of non-aristocratic origin 
themselves. In every utterance poor Burdovsky 
stumbles and says: “I have a right”.
The emphasis on the idea of right and the 
desire to build a new society on the rightful basis 
are the distinctive features of our time. However, 
to understand the basis of right we need to be 
sure (or at least to try hard to see) that it exists, 
otherwise we risk assimilating with the company 
of Burdovsky.
The subject returns the money at a smaller 
amount than he was given. It is unacceptable 
from the legal point of view, but from the point 
of view of the one returning the money it looks 
spectacular: the money is returned and no one 
cares how much has been given and taken. As 
Myshkin gave the money without any receipt, 
out of his generosity, the payout requires no legal 
formalities. The fact of the initial presence of a 
certain amount falls by the wayside. It does not 
matter anymore whether the money has to be 
returned or not: it is enough to take it and say: “I 
don’t need your money!” In fact, for Burdovsky 
both one hundred and two hundred fifty roubles 
are quite big sums. Psychologically it is not 
really so important to him how much he returns; 
to return is the only thing that matters. While 
logically, as we have just stated, it is acceptable 
not to return it at all, but just to announce that 
charity is insulting. However, let us repeat that it 
involves taking the money and use it at his own 
discretion.
The right here manifests itself in several 
forms. The first one is I have a right to demand 
what belongs to me. No one can take this right 
away from me as a person. Deceived, Burdovsky 
believes that he is a rightful heir of Mister 
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Pavlishchev, while in fact Myshkin is the one to 
get the inheritance. The second is the following: 
Burdovsky wants to be deceived, and, willing 
to stay confused without understanding the 
meaning of the legal documents, he makes some 
gestures and says some speeches about nobility. 
The law, or the legal understanding of right, and, 
the most important, the facts are not covered by 
his arguments. It is essential to understand that 
Burdovsky and his company, this new generation 
of young people, need no facts. Their right is 
based on twisted facts, on the wish to remain 
confused and, especially relevant, on the nobility 
of Prince Myshkin. Myshkin is the one to exercise 
his right to help Burdovsky, he heard the voice of 
the pleading. In both legal assumptions there is a 
lie, mispresentation of facts, and deception.
If a person happens to help a poor person 
and give him five roubles instead of the expected 
ten, it looks quite “fair” from the point of view of 
the poor to start a discussion on the greediness of 
the one who donates so little money.
The right to give alms is my free right, and 
this is the freedom that creates the fact of the 
almsgiving. In other words, the fact of giving 
money depends on myself as a subject, or, to 
be precise, on myself as a personality. And if 
we imagine that the beggar begins to demand a 
certain amount of alms, arguing that he also has a 
right to possess some money, the beggar loses his 
freedom of personality, just like does the fact of 
mercy of the almsgiver. Asking for ten roubles of 
alms instead of the five roubles given looks like 
the gluttony of a pet who “thinks” that the first 
and only task of its owner is feeding it.
Such “demands of right” and gestures of 
nobility (such as in the case of Burdovsky) can 
sometimes be extremely convincing. The whole 
culture of the Enlightenment and, partially, 
the European art of Romanticism is based on 
such gestures. But together with liking for such 
gestures and calls for equality in communication 
one should remember that for a “person of gesture” 
like Burdovsky and for his ambitious friends, 
returning one hundred roubles and returning 
two hundred fifty roubles is the same. The fact 
of Myshkin’s free mercy turns into their rightful 
and sincere demand for what they believe belongs 
to them. Just like Myshkin who could choose 
whether to give it or not, I can also choose not to 
return it. And if so, we are legally equal. The fact 
of the presence of some certain amount of money 
is transformed into a fact of presence of another 
amount of money with a gesture=interpretation. 
We find that Myshkin and Burdovsky are not 
legally equal, just like personalities are not equal 
in respect with the memory.
It is not about Myshkin’s or someone else’s 
failure to recall something no one else remembers. 
Let us emphasize that it is not about the amount, 
not about the weight of a memory. It is about 
the core of the subject. According to Plato, 
human memory is an effort about something that 
happened to the person’s soul before his birth. 
Interpreting Plato’s mythological and poetical 
expression of the significance of memory for a 
personality, we extract the following. I remember 
something that is my core. If I can remember the 
maximum of my core (I like Aristotle’s whatness 
and I believe it is appropriate here), I become 
a fully-fledged person in this society, such as a 
politician, a bureaucrat, a clerk etc. If I do not 
remember what is potentially given to me, I 
become an “odd” member of the society, such as 
Onegin or Pechorin.
It is important that in both of these cases I 
have something to remember. It means that my 
memory potentially exists, it is present here, and 
from this point of view it does not matter whether 
I have or have not remembered it yet. On the other 
hand, from the point of view of a person living 
here, in the world of things, I become myself only 
when I recall something, i.e. I make an effort to 
remember my whatness. Plato refers to this effort 
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as to anamnesis. It assumes desire, animation, 
and flight of my recalling into the area of memory 
that makes me myself. Plato gives anamnesis 
an erotic tone, and it should not confuse us; on 
the opposite, such understanding of anamnesis 
emphasizes that we want to remember, that we 
have a desire to recall. In other words, I do or do 
not become human to the extent I can actualize 
my own memory.
One should see a difference between “know 
much and remember it” and the phenomenon 
we call “memory actualization”. A person may 
learn a lot, remember this knowledge, be able to 
use it solving a crossword puzzle, but not more 
than that. Plato emphasizes that memory is not 
new knowledge; we do not learn anything new, 
we only recall what we have previously known. 
In my memory I recall myself, and without this 
memory all the other remembered knowledge 
has very little sense. “Know a lot” has nothing to 
do with memory. It is impossible to string beads 
on a non-existent string, on the absence of a 
string, on something that is not there. With all the 
beauty of pearls or turquoise, without a binding 
string, thread or a wire the necklace would not 
hold, it would fall apart, no matter how nice and 
expensive the beads are. Let us remark that such 
type of “remembering oneself” can be also applied 
to Christian anthropology. The personality is 
seeking for an “inner self”, a divine spark; it 
returns to the Eden, remembering itself as pristine 
and pure (interestingly and non-coincidentally, 
there is a specific prayer anamnesis said during 
Christian liturgy). Generally speaking, it is the “I 
need to remember” pattern the Enlightenment era 
person was also in. For example, Jean-Jacques 
Rousseau suggested to “remember” that a person 
in its core is kind, naïve and honest. L.N. Tolstoy 
“remembered” that it is necessary to live simply, 
like peasants, or like trees in the forest. In his 
letter to Gogol V.G. Belinsky “remembered” that 
the first socialist was no one but Jesus himself.
Psychoanalysis and modern psychotherapy 
in many of its variants are based on the fact that 
the patient remembers things that happened to 
him long ago by himself. That is the value: not to 
present a document (event) from the past as a fact 
of someone’s archive, but to help the patient to 
reach the fact of the past on his own.
In all these cases, though different in the core, 
we can see that memory underlies the personality 
model; a personality is impossible without it, 
understanding one’s own self is impossible 
without it. It serves as a reservoir for personal 
growth, personal desires and simultaneously the 
purpose, the entelechy of the personality. Without 
a stable memory structure, the anthropological 
frame is also lost. However, the persons having 
the memory and actualizing it are not equal; that 
is what makes them individuals. Just like it is 
natural and evident that there are no same beads, 
there are no same memories. Diamond chaplets, 
precious stone necklaces, wooden rosary and 
children’s hand-made jewellery of dried berries 
are just as unequal as Prince Myshkin and student 
Burdovsky in respect of their rights. There is no 
uniformity between them and there can never be. 
There is only being, only the memory being fact.
Being is associated with right thinking. 
Right remembering means right thinking. That 
is why to manipulate one’s memories means 
manipulating a person in general and the things 
surrounding him.
Besides a number of new objectives and 
tasks, the phenomenology of the early 20th century 
attempts to solve the problem of retaining the 
wholeness of the subjects by using the memory 
mechanisms. In the essence, E. Husserl dares 
to undertake an impossible task. He attempts 
to build a pattern of remembering all previous 
experiences in the integrity of the conditions 
of the person’s consciousness and its contents. 
In other words, he tries to stop the time, just 
like Faust did, being simultaneously here and 
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in Plato’s world of ideas. It was even beyond 
Socrates’ power, so the attempt itself deserves the 
greatest respect to the founder of phenomenology 
science. The result of such project should be 
a rational, scientific, and, first of all, integral 
subject. A different consequence shall be a real, 
material, textured thing. Thing as a fact, thing 
as an object I can remember. Let those be the 
famous boots of Heidegger (Van Gogh), a bowl, a 
stone, a bell, a roadside bench, an inkpot, a rose 
or Proust’s cookie. It is right to recall a thing, or, 
speaking the language of phenomenology, to see 
and describe it in the right way; it means to see 
the thing as it is, and, consequently, to possess it, 
to move it from place to place, to embosom it etc. 
In other words, it means to live with this thing. 
Let us emphasize, to live with this very thing, not 
another. As we remember, that was two hundred 
fifty roubles that Myshkin gave Burdovsky, not 
one hundred.
Now let us imagine that my personal 
memory is damaged. I certainly do not remember 
any events of my past, I do not remember my 
surroundings and the things I lived with and the 
events they were connected with. There are some 
memory facts, but they are vague, segmental, 
and discreet: complete amnesia is a rare 
phenomenon. The segmental facts do not make 
up a whole picture. But as we have already stated, 
a personality cannot exist without the attempts to 
remember itself. In the case of partial amnesia we 
deal with either partial, incomplete personality, 
or we are trying to restore this personality with 
the help of a different memory, which is social, 
collective one. Any traditional upbringing 
assumes that a person expelled from the society 
risks losing its wholeness and that is the reason 
why tradition “presents”, “drafts”, “models” 
the personal memory. In this modelling process 
social memory can be both behind, like myths, 
legends, historical events, heroes, victories, 
family legends, and ahead, as a social ideal. 
To become a Stierlitz, cosmonaut, Fantômas, 
Terminator, as the mass culture offers, I either 
need to have no personal memory at all, relying 
on the social one completely, or to develop some 
spying features, dexterity etc., depending on my 
inclinations. Having consciously chosen the way 
of a cosmonaut, I make a sober estimate of my 
talents, physical condition, intellectual resources. 
Without this estimate, without the “self-recalling” 
work of my memory I become nothing but a 
kitchen maid ruling the country, or a zombie/
robot, blindly following its master’s orders.
It is common for historians to think that 
during the High Classical period Greece had no 
sense of history and the past. If so, we arrive at the 
conclusion that the Greeks were guided by a heroic 
personality. Such personality is mostly geared to 
the eternal future and full self-realization. Achilles 
knows of his death, but he also knows that before 
he dies young he will have accomplished enough 
feats to be remembered by his successors forever. 
The personal memory support is essential, but 
it is nothing but support required to keep the 
person/subject within the limits of wholeness. 
Achilles is meant to be a hero and he becomes 
one. Possessing its own, conventionally speaking, 
“healthy” and full memory, a subject can always 
restore the history of things from the events of the 
past and make a step into the future. The motto 
of the Enlightenment: “Wake up, Duke, there 
are some great deeds waiting for you!” means 
that it is a personality that creates history; that 
the great deeds will be done by the one who has 
just got up from the bed. The great deeds will be 
just “waiting”; as they are, their greatness is only 
potential, and without the person’s interference 
they will just continue waiting for their time.
Turning to some later historical example 
of interaction between the social and personal 
memory, then, for example, Jung’s analytical 
psychology is also targeted at the restoration 
and retrieval of personal memory with the help 
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of the race memory. Let us emphasize, that even 
though Jung is often accused of impersonalism, 
personality is primary for any therapy, starting 
from Socrates’.
Let us state it once again: the opposition of 
“personal memory – social memory”, first of all, 
saves the subject, the person. Social memory helps 
a subject, while a subject actualizes itself, thereby 
maintaining the tradition. To become social, 
the memory first has to be mine, i.e. personal. 
Just like a sports car or a truck is primarily a 
vehicle, and its function as of a sports car or a 
truck is secondary, any memory is primarily the 
memory of oneself, and secondarily a memory 
of whatever else. Even though this conclusion is 
not so evident in the era of manipulation and total 
control of the idea of reality and the existence of 
multiple “memory policies”, we shall repeat that 
it is located entirely within the limits of classical 
philosophy, the philosophy of Plato and Aristotle 
in particular and, as it has been mentioned above, 
phenomenological philosophy as well.
A good illustration of this sort of connection 
between personal and collective memory is, to 
our mind, the poem by Robert Rozhdestvensky 
that became the “Song about Far Native Land” 
that played in the famous Soviet film “Seventeen 
Moments of Spring”. The combination of the 
lyrics with the image of the spy Isaev and the plot 
of the film expressively demonstrate the logic 
of correlation between personal and collective 
memory. In its structure, the logic coincides with 
the one presented in this article.
Let us quote several lines from “Song about 
Far Native Land”: “Oh, my shore, please appear 
to me // As an edge, as a thin line though... // 
Oh, my shore, so tender been, // How I do wish 
to swim to you now, // From this place to swim 
to you some time... // And there’s the mushroom 
rain, somewhere it is rain, // And cherry-trees bow 
to earth // In the garden small on the river bank 
// They grow there for long... // And somewhere 
far, in my memory // I feel warmth as being 
a child, // Though snow has covered my mind 
with a thick and white layer… // You, the storm, 
would you give me a drink, // Not to death, but 
to drunken state... // And again, as if it’s the last 
blink, // I look somewhere into heaven, // As if 
I’m seeking answer... 2 (bold by the author)
The memory is described in spatial, not 
temporal dimension: “far”, “covered with a thick 
and white layer”, “earth”. It is not as much about 
childhood as about something that is not here 
anymore though it once has been. In respect of 
childhood, the “now” moment is emphasized. 
Everything that happened there is now. Recalling 
himself, the subject of the memory is aspiring to 
move where he wants to “swim”, he is willing to 
reach the “shore”. It is memory that gives him 
the strength to “swim”, i.e. it is the driver of the 
movement and in this respect it is directed at the 
future. Without this memory of the mushroom 
rains and cherries there is no future. At the same 
time we think of death, of the “last time” and we 
“are seeking answer”. As the idea of death does 
not appear from the childhood itself, it means 
that the movement forward goes so far that death 
becomes visible. The idea of death is reflexive; 
the protagonist of the poem realizes that “to the 
drunken state” does not mean “to death”. But still 
the question of death is up. The “last time” is the 
possibility of losing memory, and, consequently, 
terminating the trip to the faraway shore, i.e. to 
the future. The war the film is dedicated to is 
that state where death may be encountered at any 
moment.
In the film the subject of such memory, 
being in the position of “now”, thinking of death, 
trying to reach the future shore with the help of 
his memory, is the man of war, the film character 
colonel Isaev (Stierlitz). And though in the film 
the song plays off screen and it is not the main 
character performing it, the perception of the 
audience correlates the lyrics and content of 
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the song, first of all, with the situation of Isaev. 
The narrator in the song and Isaev (Stierlitz) are 
perceived as one and the same person.
The protagonist begs his sadness and pain to 
“fly” to his home; “My sharp pain, would you go 
away…” - he says in the first line, and “My grief… 
// Would you fly as a grey cloud far // … From this 
place to native land of mine...” – he says in the 
last. Evidently, it is a message home, a letter of 
sadness and pain. Through this purely existential 
and personal experience, the “painful feeling” 
the subject of the memory attempts to reach his 
native shore. It is especially important that the 
protagonist directly says: “I beg”, “I look”, “Give 
me a drink”, thereby realizing and bringing all 
temporal and spatial ideas altogether. The past in 
the “now like in the childhood” mode, the future 
as a faraway shore, death and the last time are 
consolidated with the realized I that remembers 
all the smallest things and details (“mushroom 
rains”, “cherry-trees bowing to earth”). These 
trifles and certain facts of the past form the 
framework / structure / base / foundation of the 
personality, and it is there, “home”, the protagonist 
begs his grief and pain to go. All these facts are 
both in the past and future, though it is evident 
that I of the future does not exist anymore, but 
there is the desire, the hope to achieve it, just like 
there is a hope to win, without which the victory 
would never happen.
Stierlitz is a character of the extremely 
sophisticated temporal structure of “I”. He finds 
himself in a continuous borderline situation. 
If on the open front every attack is followed by 
the everyday frontline life, every partisan raid 
is followed by going underground, to the forest 
or a camp, Isaev (Stierlitz) in this regard is 
always simultaneously here and there. Here, in 
Germany, he is Stierlitz, while in his motherland 
he is Isaev. These two faces are for the others, 
while “inside himself” he is only identified with 
a Soviet intelligence colonel. His objective is 
to finally win the war, bring the victory closer. 
All his inner powers are targeted at this, and, 
basically, the main topic of the film is solving the 
problems he faces. Seeing Stierlitz and calling 
him “Stierlitz”, amazed by his calmness, we 
know that Stierlitz is Isaev. To make sure we do 
not forget it, the E. Kopelyan keeps reminding us 
from off screen that Stierlitz is Isaev. The past 
of Isaev and his memory are the sources of his 
integrity, it remembers the little details (the small 
garden, cherry-trees, mushroom rains); here it is 
purely personal. It is in the past where the true 
secret name of Isaev, Vsevolod Vladimirovich, is 
hidden. For him social memory acts as a task, an 
order. 
And in this sense the duty to the order and 
the law of honour empower Isaev (Stierlitz) to 
continuously restore his personal memory. For 
example, the murder of a traitor/enemy is excused 
by the situation of war and the given order. At first 
glance it seems that the social (the duty, the task) 
is the primary of Stierlitz, while the personal is 
oppressed, pushed back and forgotten.
However, his personal memory is just 
“covered”; it is neither hidden, forgotten nor 
“switched off” for a while until the victory. It 
is covered as something that is carefully stored. 
It is clear, because in the hardest moments the 
memory of the past is “retrieved” from its safe to 
fill all the deeds with meaning. It is important to 
understand why the grief and pain that overfill 
the life of Isaev (Stierlitz) and similar heroes 
of the war “fall into” the same memory, flying 
“home”. Not just anywhere, not to the place of 
destruction, not to the desert where the Jews 
would release their scapegoat, but home. The 
answer is simple: the personality cannot stand 
the tension; it is natural to release the grief and 
pain it suffers. But where is this reservoir? It is 
in the past, in that memory that is covered under 
the “thick white layer”. This memory of the past 
is so “sound”, natural and firm, that grief and 
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pain make no harm to it. Moreover, in the case of 
necessity one would have to run for this personal 
memory again to seek help; the memory of the 
past has enhanced with the grief and pain; and it 
will continue forever, as this process is endless. 
As Plotin spoke of the Unified, comparing the 
Unified with the Sun: “It gives without getting 
smaller”. We give grief and pain to get power 
and hope in return. The past cannot do it on its 
own, but hope points at the future goal: it points 
home. The post-war home of the future, where 
everyone knows of the Great Victory, is filled 
with pain and grief, but it is a faraway dream 
and a goal. The past has become the future. In 
the future the fulfilment of an order and duty 
are the realizations of the collective maxima. 
The past keeps the resource and the childhood 
facts. And the present is where the personality 
which keeps the three temporal states in itself 
lives. 
The social duty of Isaev (Stierlitz) cannot 
rely on itself only; it requires the personal form 
of this duty embodied in the personal memory. 
Just like betrayal which, though concerns the 
society, lies deep in the personality of the traitor, 
the social remembering lies deep in the memory 
of a single personality.
The interaction between the personal and 
social memories described above acutely reveals 
itself in respect with such phenomenon as war 
and such people as the participants and heroes of 
the war. It has become too common for us to see 
armies fight, hundreds of thousands and millions 
die and the “regime” or ideology win. These 
are all the facts of statistics, just like it is a fact 
the fighting ones are the people with the living 
bundle of personal memory. In the film “Ivan’s 
Childhood” by A.A. Tarkovsky the scenes of 
war life is followed by the dreams of the main 
character, the teenage spy Ivan. And the dreams 
where Ivan plays with his sister, talks to his 
mother, do make up the true life of the boy. And in 
one of those dreams in the final of the film, where 
the viewer knows about the execution of Ivan, he 
runs away on the water towards the sun. The film 
of war, sacrifice and the death of the child turn 
into a film of personal victory within one country 
and one nation, while all personalities of the film: 
Ivan, Kholin, Galtsev, Masha are different. Just 
like Myshkin and Burdovsky were.
1 Translator’s note: Russian word «история» istoriia has two meanings: story and history.
2 Translated by Lyudmila Purgina http://www.poemhunter.com/poem/r-rozhdestvensky-the-song-about-far-native-land-
transl-rus/
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Личная память и память историческая 
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В работе обосновывается логическая зависимость исторической памяти от памяти 
личностной. Доказывается, что подобного рода логика находится в основании классической 
традиции. На примерах классической русской литературы и советского кино доказывается 
правомочность данного положения.
Ключевые слова: память, личная память, общественная память, вспомнить, время, право, 
война, победа.
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